TeamPCP: From 2020 Redis Attacks to Supply-Chain Attacks

A new analysis by Oligo Security has shown that the cybercriminal group tracked as TeamPCP has been active since at least 2020 — long before it made itself publicly known and shifted to attacks on software supply chains. According to researchers Avi Lumelsky and Gal Elbaz, the connection is confirmed by overlapping domains, malware deployment paths, payload delivery techniques, server infrastructure and a shared operational signature.

Years under a single banner

Two campaigns from the second half of 2025 fell within the analysts' field of view. The first was ShadowRay 2.0 (also known as IronErn), in which hijacked AI infrastructure was turned into a self-propagating botnet. The second was TA-NATALSTATUS, which targeted exposed Redis servers to deliver cryptocurrency miners. The researchers regard the latter campaign as an evolution of the attacks that Trend Micro described back in April 2020.

For years, then, the group has attacked internet-facing Ray, Docker, Redis and React services, relying on automated and worm-like techniques for exploiting known vulnerabilities. It first drew public attention late last year in connection with the exploitation of vulnerabilities in React Server Components and Next.js to steal credentials — an operation dubbed Operation PCPcat. Later, Flare described a large-scale campaign of systematic cloud-environment hijacking: the goal was to build out a distributed proxy and scanning infrastructure and then steal data, deploy ransomware, and engage in extortion and mining.

Supply chains and the “Kamikaze” wiper

The group then moved on to high-profile supply-chain attacks, infecting developer systems by poisoning popular open-source libraries through GitHub Actions and token theft. In Oligo's assessment, one of the strongest connecting links was the match between the IronErn identifiers on GitHub and GitLab observed during ShadowRay 2.0 and the later TeamPCP infrastructure.

The malware arsenal was constantly being updated. For instance, the Python script kube.py, used after Kubernetes clusters were breached, acquired destructive functionality in variants dating to March 2026. The script checked whether the system was set to the Iranian time zone, and if so it launched a DaemonSet that wiped every node in the cluster using a wiper with the telling name Kamikaze. On nodes outside Iran, the CanisterWorm backdoor was deployed instead, while on non-Kubernetes systems in Iran a poison_pill() procedure was triggered that destroyed the entire file system.

Whether this was a direct rebranding, a shared set of operators, or close cooperation between linked groups cannot be established with full certainty. However, the evidence gathered, Oligo emphasizes, shows that TeamPCP is not a new player that suddenly emerged at the end of 2025, but a continuation of an already existing operational ecosystem.

Source: The Hacker News